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TORTS
IIEWRY S 1M3MRAIL, JR.*
A large number of cases in the field of Torts were decided dur-
ing the period covered by this Survey, as expected, since this is
undoubtedly the most active area of litigation. Although many
appellate decisions were not of general interest, being routine
decisions as to whether a jury issue was presented on the particu-
lar points, many cases did involve important questions of sub-
stantive law.
If this reviewer may be permitted a speculative opinion, sev-
eral discernible trends appear in the decisions of the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court. First, with the increasing case load, there
is the apparent and understandable tendency to dismiss appeals
on rather technical procedural grounds, principally the failure
to preserve and properly present exceptions and grounds of
appeal. Second, in the negligence cases which comprise by far
the bulk of the tort cases, primarily automobile cases, our su-
preme court is exhibiting an increasingly sophisticated and
analytical approach on such matters, for example, as proximate
cause, last clear chance, contributory negligence, and searching
the record to see if a verdict is supported by the evidence and
inferences to be drawn therefrom.
Landlord's Liability In Tort For Injuries to Tenant
Conner v. Farmers & Mer. Bank' is an important case involv-
ing the tort liability of a landlord for misfeasance in making
repairs and also the substantive law of contributory negligence.
The plaintiff, an elderly lady, had rented an apartment from
the defendant's testatrix whereby the lessor agreed to keep the
premises "safe and comfortable." Due to erosion of surface water,
a section of the brick floor of the outside entrance to the apart-
ment settled. After complaints by the plaintiff, the landlord
undertook to repair the brick floor, but too much sand was added
to the mortar used between the brick, causing the mortar to
crumble easily, leaving openings between the brick approximate-
ly three-quarters of an inch deep. More than a year after the
repairs were made, the plaintiff fell and sustained an injury
when her shoe heel caught in one of the openings between the
brick.
* Henderson, Salley, Cushman & Summerall, Aiken, S. C.
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The plaintiff elected to sue in tort, rather than for breach of
contract to repair. From the verdict in favor of the plaintiff the
defendant appealed, relying upon the well settled rule of law
that the relationship of landlord and tenant imposes no legal
duty on the landlord to keep the leased premises in repair, and
that even where there is a valid contract to repair, failure to
comply merely gives rise to a cause of action for breach of con-
tract, under which damages are not recoverable for personal
injuries sustained by reason of the defective condition of the
premises.
However, the South Carolina Supreme Court drew a distinc-
tion between negligence on the lessor's part in making repairs
and a failure to make repairs as promised, holding that negli-
gence on the part of the lessor in making repairs or improve-
ments is regarded as an act of misfeasance, subjecting him to
tort liability for any resulting damages. Misfeasance in making
repairs is an exception to the general rule of the landlord's non-
liability in tort, but it is supported by authorities.
2
The Connor case is perhaps more important for its treatment
of the substantive law of contributory negligence, discussed
below.
Wrongful Death
Three decisions this year involved important points of inter-
pretation of Lord Campbell's Act," two cases involving defenses
of intra-family immunity and the other involving interesting and
important conflicts of laws problems. Fowler v. Fowler4 was an
action for wrongful death brought by the administrator of a
deceased wife's estate against her husband for the benefit of two
minor unemancipated children. The defendant demurred upon
the grounds that to permit the action for the benefit of the minor
unemancipated children would in effect allow the children to
sue their father in tort, contrary to the settled rule in this state
that an unemancipated child has no right of action against his
parent for a personal tort.5 The court affirmed the ruling below
allowing the suit to lie, since the test for the maintenance of a
wrongful death action is whether the decedent could have sued
for personal injuries, and it is well settled that a wife can main-
2. Note, Personal Injuries to the Tenant; The Landlord's Liability in Tort
Therefor, 10 S.C.L.Q. 307 (1958).
3. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1951 to -1956 (1962).
4. 242 S.C. 252, 130 S.E.2d 568 (1963).
5. Kelly v. Kelly, 158 S.C. 517, 155 S.E. 888 (1930).
(Vol. 17
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tain an action against her husband for personal injuries sustained
in an automobile accident.6 The decision in the Fowler case was
based upon the construction of the applicable statutes,7 rather
than upon policy considerations.
Maxey v. Saulss was a suit by the administratrix of the estate
of a deceased minor against the estate of his deceased parent. A
demurrer to the plaintiff's complaint on behalf of the deceased
father's administrator was sustained upon the grounds that the
plaintiff's intestate was an unemancipated child and therefore
had no cause of action against his parent's estate. The court af-
firmed, overruling the plaintiff's contentions on appeal as fol-
lows: (1) the death of a parent or child does not remove the
reason for the rule since a wrongful death action is not main-
tainable unless the decedent could have maintained an action
to recover for his injuries had he lived; (2) allegations of wil-
fulness on the part of the deceased parent do not change the rule,
even though the Wrongful Death Statute9 refers to "a wrongful
act, neglect or default"; (3) the fact that the deceased father
carried automobile liability insurance does not change the rule
by eliminating any disruption of family unity or harmony which
is the basis for the immunity rule, since regardless of the pres-
ence of liability insurance the original liability is that of the
parent and the presence of insurance does not create liability or
a cause of action where none otherwise existed.
McDaniel v. McDaniel0 partially settled a question which
from time to time has greatly concerned South Carolina attor-
neys practicing on the Georgia side of the state: when suit is
brought in the courts of South Carolina for a wrongful death
which occurred in Georgia, is the proper party plaintiff the per-
sonal representative of the decedent or the beneficiary designated
by the Georgia Wrongful Death Act?.
Of course, under South Carolina law, the right of action is
vested in the personal representative of the decedent's estate,"
while the Georgia statute gives the right of action to the bene-
ficiary or beneficiaries jointly.12 This question is not one of aca-
6. Pardue v. Pardue, 167 S.C. 129, 166 S.E. 101 (1932).
7. S.C. CCDE ANN. §§ 10-216, -1951 (1962).
8. 242 S.C. 247, 130 S.E.2d 570 (1963).
9. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1951 (1962).
10. 243 S.C. 286, 133 S.E.2d 809 (1963).
11. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1952 (1962).
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demic interest alone, as it becomes of crucial importance in litiga-
tion and in concluding proper settlement of such claims.
The McDaniel case involved the Georgia homicide of a woman,
in which case the Georgia statute provides that the husband
and/or children may recover and that those surviving at the
time the action is brought shall sue jointly and not severally.
Under familiar conflicts of laws principles, the lea loci (here
Georgia law) governs the substantive rights of the parties and
the Ze.ro ori (here South Carolina law) governs procedural mat-
ters. Relying upon Judge Timmerman's decision in Anderson v.
Lane,13 the court held that since the Georgia statute imposed the
mandatory requirement that suit be brought by the husband
and/or children ("shall sue jointly and not separately"), such
provisions are substantive and not merely procedural. Hence, it
was held that the trial court properly dismissed the action
brought by the administrator.
Our court had previously considered the similar situation
where suit is brought in South Carolina for the wrongful death
in Georgia of a husband and father in which case the Georgia
statute provides: "A widow, or if no widow, a child or children,
may recover for the homicide of the husband or parent." Bussey
v. Charleston & IV. Car. Ry.14 held that in such case suit in
South Carolina must be brought by the personal representative
and could not be brought by the widow in her individual ca-
pacity.
The court in the McDaniel case held that the presence of the
words "shall sue jointly and not separately" in the Georgia stat-
ute relating to recovery for death of the wife required a holding
that such provision formed a part of the right and not of the
remedy alone. However, it seems that such language merely
forbids separate suits by the husband and children, and does not
require a holding contrary to the Bussey case, especially since
the primary portion of both statutes is the same ("may recover").
The reasoning of the McDaniel case casts some doubt on the au-
thority of the Bussey case, but if it is still sound law, we are in
the anomalous position of holding that the proper party plain-
tiff in a suit brought in South Carolina for a wrongful death
occurring in Georgia depends upon the sex of the decedent.
13, 97 F. Supp. 265 (E.D.S.C. 1951).
14. 73 S.C. 215, 53 S.E. 165 (1906).
[Vol. 17
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Several cases this year involved the immunity of governmental
agencies from tort suits, and the interpretation of statutes waiv-
ing immunity in certain situations.
Jones v. Jones15 probably received more newspaper publicity
than any other tort case this year. A Sumter attorney sued his
wife, the Probate Judge of Sumter County, several physicians
and the South Carolina State Hospital, alleging various tortious
acts including a conspiracy to arrest and incarcerate him unlaw-
fully in the State Hospital, subjecting him to shock and other
treatments, and depriving him of personal and property rights
on the false contention that he was mentally ill. The court af-
firmed the sustaining of the demurrer interposed by the State
Hospital, re-affirming the thoroughly settled rule that an agent,
instrumentality or subdivision of the state cannot be sued in a
tort action in the absence of express legislative consent, which
had not been given in this case. The court further held that the
state constitution makes no provision for compensation by the
state for a citizen's deprivation of liberty and incidentally of
his property rights, since such deprivation does not amount to a
taking for a public use. Further, the court re-affirms the settled
rule that there is no distinction between governmental and pro-
prietary functions of the sovereign in South Carolina.
Cochran v. City of Sumter 16 held that the requirement of sec-
tion 47-71 of the 1962 Code that a verified claim must be filed
with a municipality within three months after the date of injury
in order to maintain an action against the municipal corporation
is an absolute requirement and was not met by a letter sent within
the time limit. Actual knowledge by the governing body of the
municipality or of its officials does not waive, preclude or estop
the governmental agency from asserting failure to give such
notice, and the requirement of verification is an absolute require-
ment, being a matter of substance and not of mere form.
Patrick v. South Carolina Highway Dep't17 held that the stat-
utes waiving the highway department's immunity from suit for
wrongful death' 8 do not require an affirmative allegation in the
complaint that the beneficiaries are free from contributory negli-
15. 243 S.C. 600, 135 S.E.2d 233 (1964).
16. 242 S.C. 382, 131 S.E.2d 153 (1963).
17. 243 S.C. 246, 133 S.E.2d 751 (1963).
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gence, but only that the decedent's negligence did not cause or
contribute to his injury.
Coker v. Nationwide Hut. Ins. Co.19 holds that in an action
under the statute authorizing suit directly against the school bus
liability insurer for personal injuries suffered because of the
negligent operation of a school bus, 20 allegations as to reckless-
ness, willfulness and wantonness are irrelevant and should be
stricken from the complaint. The court further held that if the
defense of contributory negligence were raised in the answer, the
plaintiff would have a right to overcome such plea by a showing
of reckless, wilful and wanton conduct.
Indemnity Between Joint Tortfeasors
Two important cases on the right of indemnity between joint
tortfeasors were decided by our court this year. Taking both
cases together, they establish the principle that no right of in-
demnity exists under the common law in South Carolina be-
tween mere joint tortfeasors, in the absence of an express contract
of indemnity. However, a number of questions were left unde-
cided, and this will doubtless be a growing area of tort litigation
in the future.
In Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Whetstone21 the complaint
alleged in substance that the plaintiff railroad had compromised
the FELA claim of its employee who had been injured while
riding the lead end of a track car which struck a scaffolding
erected by the defendant too close to the spur track; the plaintiff
sought to be indemnified by the defendant in the sum of 6,250
dollars, the amount of the settlement, upon the theory that the
injury and loss was directly and proximately caused by the de-
fendant's "active gross negligence and carelessness" in erecting
and permitting the unmarked and unlighted scaffolding to re-
main too close to the railroad tracks.
The court in a three-two decision held that the trial court
correctly sustained the defendant's demurrer, holding that there
can be no right of indemnity among mere joint tortfeasors, rea-
soning that since negligence is required to impose liability under
FELA, the plaintiff by making the settlement with its employee
in effect admitted negligence in failing to provide its employee
19. 243 S.C. 170, 133 S.E.2d 122 (1963).
20. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 21-840 (1962).
21. 243 S.C. 61, 132 S.E.2d 172 (1963).
[Vol. 17
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a safe place to work. The court consequently applied the general
rule denying indemnity of one joint tortfeasor against another.
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brailsford, joined by
Mr. Justice Bussey, seems more just and much more persuasive
than the majority opinion, pointing out that the facts alleged in
the complaint fall clearly within the exceptions to the general
rule recognized in the majority opinion and that under over-
whelming authorities the right of indemnity arises in favor of
one tortfeasor whose negligence has been merely passive against
another whose negligence has been active, particularly where
the passive negligence amounts to a failure to discover or correct
a defect or remedy a dangerous condition caused by the act of
the one primarily responsible.
South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co. v. Utilities Constr. Co.22 was
a suit on an express contract of indemnity rather than under
the common law as was the Whetstone case. 23 The defendant, an
independent contractor, had entered into a written contract with
the plaintiff, holder of the electric franchise for the Town of
Holly Hill, for certain construction and maintenance work, in-
cluding the replacement of an old pole located in the sidewalk
of Main Street. The contract included the following:
(e) The Contractor hereby agrees to indemnify and to
hold the Company harmless from any and all claims for
damages to persons and/or property arising out of or in any
way connected with the performance of any work covered
by this contract.
24
In performing the work, the defendant repaired the sidewalk
in an improper manner, using a defective mixture of cement.
The defect could not be detected by appearance upon inspection.
Four years later a Mrs. Bant stepped into the depression in the
patched area of the sidewalk, fell and was severely injured. Mrs.
Brant sued both the present plaintiff and the defendant, and
the plaintiff paid her 36,000 dollars in settlement of her claim
and instituted this suit to cover said sum plus attorneys' fees and
costs for the defendant under its indemnity contract.
The principal defenses apparently were that no indemnity is
allowed as between joint tortfeasors, that the written contract
22. 244 S.C. 79, 135 S.E.2d 613 (1964).
23. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Whetstone, 243 S.C. 61, 132 S.E.2d 172
(1963).
24. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co. v. Utilities Constr. Co., 244 S.C. 79, 83,
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did not cover the claimed liability, that the defendant's liability,
if any, terminated upon completion of the work and its accept-
ance by the plaintiff and that the plaintiff failed to inspect and
discover the defendant's faulty work.
The plaintiff sought to impose liability against the defendant
under the contract of indemnity and under indemnity implied
by law. Judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed by a majority
of the court under the written contract of indemnity. Two mem-
bers of the court felt that liability should also be imposed upon
the theory of indemnity implied by law.
The court distinguished the Whetstone case25 which denied
recovery of one joint tortfeasor against another when no con-
tractual or legal relationship existed between them, since there
was an express contract of indemnity in the South Carolina Elec.
& Gas case. Further, acceptance of the work by the plaintiff did
not relieve the defendant from liability as the defect was latent,
not subject to detection by reasonable inspection, and by its na-
ture would not become apparent until a later time. By stipula-
tion, the plaintiff had no actual knowledge of the dangerous
defect.
Taking the two cases together, there is still some doubt whether
the distinction between active and passive negligence has any
application to a claim for indemnity under common law prin-
ciples.
Uninsured Motorist Law
Two cases reviewed in the Torts Section of this year's Survey
arose under the Uninsured Motorist Act, one involving punitive
damages and the other concerning a subrogation claim.
A case which excited much discussion in legal circles and whose
holding was subsequently reversed by legislative enactment was
Laird v. Nationwide Ins. Co.26 in which the court held in a 3
to 2 decision that neither the provisions of the insurance policy
in question nor the Uninsured Motorist Act 27 required coverage
for punitive damages awarded the plaintiff-insured against an
uninsured motorist. The narrow holding of the case is that puni-
tive damages are not awarded to compensate for "bodily injury,"
since actual or compensatory damages serve that function. By
25. 243 S.C. 61, 132 S.E.2d 172 (1963).
26. 243 S.C. 388, 134 S.E.2d 206 (1964).
27. S.C. CoDE ANN. §§ 46-750.11 to -.28 (Supp. 1964).
[Vol. 17
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legislative act the law of the Laird case has been overruled, so
that the Uninsured Motorist Act now covers both actual and
punitive damages, up to the statutory limits.
Motors Ins. Corp. v. Surety Ins. 00.28 held that a collision
insurer which has paid a loss caused by actionable negligence of
the operator of an uninsured motor vehicle is not entitled to
subrogation against the uninsured motorist coverage of the same
insured. The court reasoned that subrogation is an equitable
right and is available only where the equities of the party assert-
ing it are superior to those of the party against whom it is
claimed, that the right of subrogation does not automatically
arise upon proof that the insured could have recovered from the
third party, and that the Uninsured Motorist Act does not pro-
vide for indemnity in this situation, particularly since the col-
lision insurer received a premium for bearing such risk of loss
while the uninsured motorist coverage by law must be provided
without premium.
Tort Liability of Life Insurance Company For Issuing
Policy Without Insured's Consent
The interesting case of Ramey v. Carolina Life Ins. Co.29 holds
that an insurer is liable for damages in a tort action for either
negligently or knowingly issuing a policy of life insurance in
favor of a beneficiary who has obtained such policy without the
knowledge or consent of the insured, even though the beneficiary
has an insurable interest in the insured's life. In this case the
plaintiff alleged that his wife had poisoned him with arsenic
in an attempt to kill him to collect the 5,000 dollars benefits of
a life insurance policy issued by the defendant without the plain-
tiff's knowledge or consent.
Our court had previously held a life insurance policy issued
under such circumstances void as against public policy,30 but
the Ramey case goes much further in holding the insurer liable
in tort under such circumstances and in declaring that a life
insurance company has a duty to use reasonable care not to issue
a policy of life insurance in favor of a beneficiary who has no
interest in the continuation of the life of the insured. This is
28. 243 S.C. 487, 134 S.E.2d 631 (1964).
29. 244 S.C. 16, 135 S.E.2d 362 (1964).
30. Hack v. Metz, 173 S.C. 413, 176 S.E. 314 (1934); Moseley v. American
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the first decision to this effect in South Carolina, and apparently
there are few similar decisions in the United States.3 1
In the Ramey case, which arose by way of demurrer to the
complaint, the court refused to hold upon a consideration of the
complaint that the proximate cause of the plaintiff's poisoning
was the intervening criminal act of his wife which was not
reasonably foreseeable by the defendant.
Attachment Lien Against Negligently Operated Vehicle
In Layton v. Flowers3 2 the court followed the principle of
stare decisis and refused to disturb the precedent of Tate v.
Braizer33 which held that the plea of bona fide purchaser of an
automobile is no defense against the statutory collision lien 4
which provides that the lien against an automobile which is
driven negligently causing damage shall be next in priority after
taxes. However, the court equitably limited the value of such lien
to the automobile's fair market value after the collision, and
would not allow the attaching creditor the windfall of the ex-
tensive repairs paid for by the innocent purchaser.
Sudden Emergency Doctrine
In Elrod v. All 35 the plaintiff, a guest passenger in the All
automobile, instituted suit for personal injuries against the de-
fendant All, her host driver, and Bankston, driver of the adverse
vehicle. The Bankston vehicle had entered U. S. Highway No. 52
directly in front of the All automobile, and to avoid a collision,
the defendant All cut sharply to his left, colliding with a tree,
causing personal injuries to the plaintiff. Verdict for the plain-
tiff was reversed and judgment entered for defendant All, the
only appellant, upon the grounds that under the guest statute"
there was no liability on his part. The complaint alleged facts
which indicated that the defendant All was faced with a sudden
emergency. In reversing the case, the South Carolina Supreme
Court referred to the general rule that the parties to an action
are judicially concluded and bound by the allegations of their
31. See Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Weldon, 267 Ala. 171, 100 So.2d 696,
61 A.LR.2d 1346 (1957).
32. 243 S.C. 421, 134 S.E.2d 247 (1964).
33. 115 S.C. 283, 105 S.E. 412 (1920).
34. S.C. Con ANN. § 45-551 (1962).
35. 243 S.C. 425, 132 S.E.2d 410 (1964).
36. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-801 (1962).
[Vol. 17
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pleading, unless withdrawn, altered or stricken by amendment or
otherwise, and that the allegations, statements or admissions con-
tained in a pleading are conclusive against the pleader, the evi-
dence contradicting such pleadings is inadmissible. The court
further referred to the general rule that a party is concluded by
his own testimony which is favorable to the adverse party and
by testimony of his own witnesses where he does not prove the
facts to be otherwise than as such witnesses testified them to be.
Watson v. Aiken37 is an excellent illustration of the applica-
tion of the sudden emergency or sudden peril doctrine in the
factual setting of a child on a rolling coaster wagon emerging
suddenly from a driveway.
Invasion of Right of Privacy
Nappier v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co.38 an action for
invasion of the right of privacy, arose out of the rape at Kings-
tree, S. C., of two girls employed with the "Little Jack" puppet
show of the Dental Division of the State Board of Health. The
defendant's television station WBTW did not mention the plain-
tiffs' names, but showed pictures of the distinctive red station
wagon with an identifying inscription on the door and described
the vehicle as that used by the two young women who had been
attacked in Kingstree. The district court dismissed the com-
plaints, but the court of appeals reversed, holding the plaintiffs
had stated a cause of action under the common law and under
the statute39 making it a misdemeanor to publish the "name" of
a rape victim, the majority of the appellate court holding that
"name"5 as used in the statute meant "identity."
Wrongful Interference ith Contractual Relations
In Crowe v. Domestic Loans, Inc.40 the complaint against both
Domestic Loans, Inc. and Lenders, Inc. alleged that because of
telephone calls by the defendants to the plaintiff's manager and
supervisor about his indebtedness, the plaintiff was discharged
from his employment at Eckerd's Drug Store. In appealing the
denial of its demurrer, the appellant Domestic Loans contended
that there was no allegation of concerted action of the two de-
fendants, and hence their acts were independent and a joint suit
37. 243 S.C. 368, 133 S.E.2d 833 (1963).
38. 322 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1963).
39. S.C. CGDE ANN. § 16-81 (1962).
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would not lie. After summarizing the substantive law of tortious
interference with contractual relations, the court applied the
established rule that a liability which is both joint and several
arises from separate and independent acts of two or more tort-
feasors where a single injury proximately results, even in the
absence of community of design or concerted action.
Employer's Liability for Injury to Employee
Hodge v. Forester Trucking Co.41 was an action involving
the common law liability of an employer for injuries to an
employee. The plaintiff allegedly sustained injuries in a fall
from a truck-trailer body caused when the defendant Forester,
vice-president of the defendant corporation, suddenly pulled on
an electric cord attached to a drill being operated by the plain-
tiff causing him to fall from the trailer. The court held that
viewing all the testimony most favorably to the plaintiff, a jury
question was presented as to actionable negligence of the de-
fendants and as to contributory negligence on the part of the
plaintiff.
Last Clear Chance
The doctrine of last clear chance was clarified in several de-
cisions this year.
In Suber V. SMith42 the court held that the doctrine (some-
times called the doctrine of discovered peril, the doctrine of
supervening negligence or the humanitarian doctrine) does not
apply to a situation where the defendant, while under a duty to
discover the danger to the plaintiff, did not actually discover it
and the injured person was physically able to escape from the
peril at any time up to the moment of impact. Furthermore, said
the court:
. . . where the injured person was not oblivious of his dan-
ger but had actually discovered the facts of his peril and
ought to have realized the danger, and he was physically
able to extricate himself, his contributory negligence has
been held to relieve the defendant motorist of liability for
negligence although the danger was actually discovered, and
the peril ought to have been realized by the defendant.4 3
41. 243 S.C. 214, 133 S.E.2d 246 (1963).
42. 243 S.C. 458, 134 S.E.2d 404 (1964).
43. Id. at 468, 134 S.E.2d at 409.
[Vol. 17
12
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 1 [], Art. 19
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol17/iss1/19
TORTS SURVEYED
In Hopkins v. Reynolds44 the court held that the doctrine is
not available to the plaintiff where he was guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law for otherwise such defense would
disappear.
The court further stated:
However, regardless of the view taken of the testimony in
this case, the fact remains that by the exerise of due care the
plaintiff could have avoided the accident by simply stopping
at anytime before she was struck. Yet, after the car could
have been seen, she continued to walk from a place of safety
into the oncoming vehicle. Her active negligence continued
up to the time of the impact and bars recovery.
45
The doctrine was also involved in Southern, Ry. v. Wilkinson
Trucking Co.46 in which it was held to be a jury issue.
Pedestrian Cases
A special category this year is the group of four pedestrian
vs. automobile cases. It is noteworthy that in all four cases ver-
dicts for the plaintiffs were reversed and entered for the defend-
ant on the ground of contributory negligence as to the adult
plaintiff-pedestrians and on the ground of no actionable negli-
gence of the defendant as to the two minor plaintiff-pedestrians.
In Hopkins v. Reynolds4 7 the plaintiff, a seventy-eight year-
old pedestrian, was struck by the defendant's automobile as she
was crossing the road in daylight to go to her mailbox. The
South Carolina court reversed a verdict for the plaintiff, holding
her guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, stating
the following quotation from Carm, v. Swindler" applicable to
the situation:
We find no evidence in the record justifying the infer-
ence that respondent, if negligent at all, was guilty of more
than simple negligence. And we think that the evidence on
behalf of appellant points conclusively to contributory negli-
gence on her part. It was her duty before attempting to cross
the highway, to see that the way was clear, especially since
44. 243 S.C. 568, 135 S.E.2d 75 (1964).
45. Id. at 574, 135 S.E.2d at 77.
46. 243 S.C. 150, 132 S.E.2d 491 (1963).
47. 243 S.C. 568, 135 S.E.2d 75 (1964).
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she was about to cross at a point where vehicular traffic had
the right-of-way; and her failure to look would have been
contributory negligence. Had she looked, she could not have
failed to see, as her daughter did (here plaintiff's son), the
lights of respondent's truck approaching. It is obvious there-
fore that she either did not look, or, if she looked, she did so
in such careless fashion as not to see what was in plain view,
in either case she was guilty of contributory negligence as
a matter of law.
In Dean v. Cole4 ) there was only circumstantial evidence as
to the identity of the hit-and-run automobile which struck the
plaintiff's decedent at night near the center of the pavement.
The only evidence of negligence on the part of the motorist, as-
suming it to have been the defendant, was the estimate of another
motorist in front of the defendant's car that it was traveling 60
to 70 miles per hour. The court of appeals held (1) even assum-
ing speed of the defendant's car, there was no factual basis for
an inference that such speed was the proximate cause of the
accident; and (2) the plaintiff's intestate was guilty of con;
tributory negligence as a matter of law, for either he failed to
look before walking into the highway, or if he looked, he did so
in such a negligent and careless manner that he failed to see
what was obvious.
Gunnels v. Roao7Lh was an action for personal injuries to the
minor plaintiff who, while playing tag, ran from between parked
cars into the right rear door of the defendant's automobile. This
was an unusual case, for the court held that despite testimony
in the record that the defendant said he was actually respon-
sible for it in that he was looking off the road, there was no
actionable negligence on the part of the defendant, since failure
to keep a proper lookout, under the circumstances, could not
have been a proximate cause of the accident. Here the defendant's
inattention was regarded as coincidental rather than causal. The
court relied upon the recent leading case on proximate cause,
Horton v. Greyhound Oorp.51 The court stated:
The circumstantial evidence fully supports the uncontra-
dicted testimony that the boy was in view only momentarily
before the impact. Had defendant seen him at the instant
49. 326 F.2d 907 (4th Cir. 1964).
50. 243 S.C. 248, 133 S.E.2d 757 (1963).
51. 241 S.C. 430, 128 S.E.2d 776 (1962).
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he became visible, the collision could not have been avoided.
Under the familiar "but for" or "without which" test of
causal connection, negligence in failing to properly look out
for that which could not have been seen in time to have
avoided an accident can not be held a proximate cause of
resulting injuries.
52
In view of the photographic evidence of the scene and the alle-
gation of the complaint that the plaintiff was struck while at-
tempting to cross the road, the court rejected the plaintiff's
testimony that he was struck while a yard off the road as being
without probative value.
In Watson v. Aiken," an action for the wrongful death of a
minor, the plaintiff's intestate riding a coaster wagon was struck
by the defendant's automobile after entering the highway from
a private driveway. The defendant's view of the driveway on
his right was obstructed by tall grass and weeds. A verdict for
the plaintiff was reversed and judgment entered for the de-
fendant. The plaintiff charged the defendant with negligence
in failing to turn farther to his left, to turn to his right or to
remain in his lane of travel so as to avoid striking the child.
The court rejected this contention, stating:
We think that either view imposes on the defendant the
burden of exercising a degree of skill and foresight which
the law does not require. It is abundantly clear that the
defendant, without negligence on his part, was cast in a
sudden emergency and is entitled to the benefit of the ap-
plicable rule.54
The plaintiff in arguing to support the verdict contended that
an inference of excessive speed could be drawn from the length
of the skid marks (70 feet 4 inches) and the post collision posi-
tion of the wagon (50 feet from the point of impact) and of the
child's body (18 feet beyond the wagon). The court stated that
the post collision positions had no probative value on the issue
of speed because the impact occurred within ten feet of the auto-
mobile's stopping point. The court also held that an inference
of excessive speed could not be drawn from the evidence as to the
length of skid marks without some evidence as to the braking
52. Gunnels v. Roach, 243 S.C. 248, 252, 133 S.E.2d 757, 760 (1963).
53. 243 S.C. 368, 133 S.E.2d 833 (1963).
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distance required to stop a vehicle from the speed otherwise indi-
cated by the evidence.
Contributory Negigence
This old plaintiffs' stumbling block was responsible for the
reversal of several important plaintiffs' verdicts this year. In
others the defendants were unsuccessful on appeal in arguing
that the plaintiffs were barred by contributory negligence as a
matter of law. Of course the facts make the law.
Two of the cases were discussed in the section above, involving
adult pedestrians.
Conner v. Farmers & Mer. Bank is an extremely important
case on the substantive law of contributory negligence. The testi-
mony in that case showed that the plaintiff, an elderly woman,
was well aware of the hazardous condition of the brick floor
which caused her fall and resulting injuries. However, she testi-
fied that as she began to go out of the door, she noticed that the
screen door was slightly open and that her pet parakeet was
about to escape, which momentarily distracted her attention and
caused her to turn loose of the table to which she was holding,
and with her attention momentarily distracted, her shoe heel
caught in one of the openings between the brick and she fell.
The defendant argued strenuously that the plaintiff was barred
from recovery by her own contributory negligence and assump-
tion of risk.
In sustaining the verdict for the plaintiff, the South Carolina
Supreme Court recognized certain principles of law not hereto-
fore recognized in South Carolina as follows:
The general rule for determining whether forgetfulness
by a plaintiff of a known danger constitutes contributory
negligence is no different from the rule applied in other sit-
uations, that is, forgetfulness or inattention will amount to
negligence if it amounts to a failure to exercise due care.
The law recognizes that the person of ordinary reason and
prudence sometimes forgets, is sometimes inattentive, and
is not perfect or infallible. Therefore, forgetfulness or inat-
tention may be excused when the circumstances are such that
a jury could reasonably conclude that a person of ordinary
prudence, so situated, might have forgotten.
55. 243 S.C. 132, 132 S.E.2d 385 (1963).
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While forgetfulness of, or inattention to, a known danger
may under certain circumstances be excused, it is recognized
that a too liberal application of the principle can result in
fraud and could completely destroy the defense of contribu-
tory negligence. Therefore, it is settled that mere forget-
fulness or inattention is insufficient. It is not enough to say
"I forgot." Neither is it enough to merely show that there
was some diverting circumstance at the time. In order to
keep forgetfulness of, or inattention to, a known danger
from constituting contributory negligence as a matter of
law, the evidence must be such as to give rise to a reasonable
inference that the forgetfulness or inattention relied upon
was induced by some immediate, substantial and adequate
disturbing cause, to be determined in the light of the exigen-
cies of the situation and the facts and circumstances of the
particular occasion. 56
There is no reason why the same circumstances which might ex-
cuse contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff would
not also excuse or justify conduct otherwise amounting to negli-
gence on the part of a defendant.
Baker 'v. MeNaughton5 7 involves the defense of contributory
negligence arising from intoxication in an unusual factual set-
ting. After McNaughton's cab had delivered the plaintiff to his
home after a night of rather heavy drinking, McNaughton's bat-
tery failed to start the cab. Jenkins' cab came to push McNaugh-
ton's cab, and the plaintiff, his curiosity piqued, came to the
scene from his home 500 feet away. While the two taxicabs were
positioned for pushing on paved Highway No. 200, the defend-
ant Hasty's vehicle came upon the scene headed in the same
direction as the taxicabs and struck both of them and the plain-
tiff standing in the middle of the left lane.
Upon appeal by MlcNaughton of the adverse verdict, the South
Carolina Supreme Court held that a directed verdict should have
been granted as to him, since the plaintiff was contributorily
negligent and reckless in that he saw the Hasty vehicle approach-
ing from one-half mile away and had ample time to get out of
the road but did not do so.
56. Id. at 142, 132 S.E.2d at 390.
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Lynch v. Alexander5 s was a suit under the guest passenger
statute"0 for the wrongful death of a guest passenger. The court
affirmed the verdict for the plaintiff, holding that the question
of contributory recklessness on the part of the decedent was a
jury question and not a matter of law.
The case contains an excellent statement of the duty of the
guest to protest the manner of operation of the automobile and
to leave it for his own protection, and the opinion goes more
fully into those matters than any other South Carolina decision,
the ultimate test being summed up as follows:
The test, therefore, is not whether a guest, knowing that the
driver's conduct is improper, has a reasonable opportunity
to leave the automobile, but whether a reasonable opportun-
ity being afforded, a person in the exercise of ordinary care
would have done so under the circumstances6
0
Powell v. Shore0 ' arose from a collision which occurred when
the defendant coming from Myrtle Beach on old Highway 501
collided with the plaintiff entering an intersection against a
yield right-of-way sign. The court upheld the jury verdict for
the plaintiff, refusing to find the plaintiff guilty of contributory
wilfulness as a matter of law. The defendant's motion for di-
rected verdict was upon the sole ground of contributory wrong-
doing on the plaintiff's part, apparently conceding wilfulness on
the defendant's part.
In Clark v. Southerm Ry. 2 the court reversed an order of in-
voluntary nonsuit in an automobile-railroad crossing case and
held that a jury issue was presented as to whether the plaintiff
was guilty of gross contributory negligence, particularly since
the plaintiff was familiar with the crossing and his view in one
direction was obstructed by tall weeds.
In Isgett v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.63 the court of appeals
reversed Judge Martin's direction of verdict in favor of the rail-
road. The car in which the plaintiff's decedent was riding went
too far to its left at the crossing and lodged against one of the
rails of the double track crossing where it stalled and was struck
58. 242 S.C. 208, 130 S.E.2d 563 (1963).
59. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 46-801 (1962).
60. Lynch v. Alexander, 242 S.C. 208, 214, 130 S.E.2d 563, 566 (1963).
61. 242 S.C. 403, 131 S.E.2d 155 (1963).
62. 243 S.C. 27, 131 S.E.2d 844 (1963).
63. 328 F.2d 364 (4th Cir. 1964).
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by the train before the plaintiff's decedent and the other occu-
pants had gotten out, although they had a minute and a half to
do so. The pavement was twenty-nine feet wide on both sides of
the tracks approaching the crossing, but only eighteen feet wide
at the crossing. The court held that the decedent's failure to
extricate himself from the stalled atuomobile was not contribu-
tory negligence as a matter of law, since the reason why the car
stalled where it did was important, and since the railroad had
the burden of proving that he had freedom to get out, all such
issues being for the jury.
In Williams v. Davis6" a wrongful death action, the plaintiff's
case was based largely upon circumstantial evidence. The plain-
tiff's intestate had driven a pickup truck into the highway from
a private driveway on the defendant's right. After stopping, be-
fore entering the highway, he was in the process of making a
left turn when the defendant's pulp wood truck, traveling at 45
miles per hour, struck the pickup truck killing the driver. The
court set aside the verdict for plaintiff on the grounds that the
plaintiff's intestate was contributorily negligent in that he
either saw or should have seen the defendant's oncoming truck,
and failed to yield the right-of-way to it or he failed to look
for approaching traffic before entering the highway. This case
holds clearly, in line with older authority, that merely stopping
before entering the highway is not sufficient and does not relieve
one of further responsibility, but one must look for approaching
traffic in such a manner as to accomplish the purpose of look-
ing. In other words, stopping and looking is not enough: you
must stop and take a good look.
Suber v. Smith6" arose from the quite common situation in
which a motorist turns off a main highway at night onto a sec-
ondary paved road and stops his automobile partly on the shoul-
der but mostly on the pavement and goes into adjacent woods for
the purpose of relieving himself. The plaintiff had done so in
this case, and had left his lights burning and the engine running.
When he returned to the car, he noticed lights of the defendant's
automobile approaching from his rear and decided to remain
parked until it had passed him. Although there was ample room
for the defendant's vehicle to have passed the plaintiff's automo-
bile on its left, the defendant's vehicle collided with the rear of
the plaintiff's vehicle, injuring the plaintiff. The trial judge
64. 243 S.C. 524, 134 S.Et2d 760 (1964).
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nonsuited the plaintiff and the South Carolina Supreme Court
affirmed upon the grounds that the plaintiff was guilty of con-
tributory negligence as a matter of law in violating the appli-
cable code section, 6 and that the defendant collided with the
rear of the plaintiff's automobile does not amount to recklessness
absent a showing of unlawful speed, and therefore is insufficient
to overcome the plaintiff's contributory negligence.
The law applicable to the case was stated thusly:
We have held that in an action for damages arising out of
collision with a vehicle standing on the highway, the burden
of proving the necessity for stopping a vehicle on the main-
traveled portion of the highway where practicability of mov-
ing it off such portion, within the meaning of the aforesaid
statute regulating stops on the highway, is on the person who
makes such stop. . . When it is necessary for a motorist to
stop his vehicle along the road, he has the duty, where it is
reasonably possible, to drive until he finds a space to stop
off the traveled portion of the road. . . . It has also been
held that if there is sufficient space for stopping off the
traveled portion of the highway or if there is a driveway
or side road near, and the stopping motorist is able to move
his vehicle into that area, he may be charged with negligence
in failing to do so. It is no excuse for the violation of such a
statute that the driver was in the vehicle and at the wheel
at the time it was left standing on the highway. .... 67
The decision is also authority for the principle that a motorist
who subsequently collides with the rear of a vehicle in front of
him is entitled to assume that the foremost vehicle would not
obstruct the highway unlawfully.
Misoelaneous Automobile Cases
In Boyleston v. Baxley s the plaintiff was injured in a col-
lision with an automobile she was meeting which went out of
66. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 46-481 (1962).
Outside of business or residence districts.-Upon a highway outside
of a business or residence district no person shall stop, park or leave stand-
iug any vehicle, whether attended or unattended, upon a paved or main-
traveled part of the highway when it is practicable to stop, park or leave
such vehicle off such part of such highway, but in every event an unob-
structed width of the highway opposite a standing vehicle shall be left for
the free passage of other vehicles and a clear view of such stopped vehicle
shall be available from a distance of two hundred feet in each direction
upon such highway.
67. Suber v. Smith, 243 S.C. 458, 465, 134 S.E.2d 404, 407 (1964).
68. 243 S.C. 281, 133 S.E.2d 796 (1963).
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control. The defendant's intestate, J. B. Baxley, was found dead
-with a broken neck after the collision in the car also occupied
by Noah Baxley. The defendant appealed from the adverse ver-
dict of 45,000 dollars upon two grounds: (1) the evidence was
insufficient to show that J. B. Baxley was driving the automo-
bile; (2) the trial judge erred in refusing to allow the defend-
ant's counsel to argue to the jury as a reasonable inference
whether or not defendant's intestate was dead or alive at the
time of the collision.
On the first point, the court held that despite the absence of
direct testimony, the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to
support the conclusion that J. B. Baxley was driving the vehicle
as he had been seen driving the car one mile before the collision,
and there was testimony that Noah Baxley had never been seen
to drive an automobile in thirty years.
The second point on appeal was based upon the testimony of
the examining physician on cross-examination that the only way
to establish the cause of death as a scientific fact, excluding all
other possible causes, is to perform an autopsy, which had not
been done, and that the witness could not be sure that J. B. Bax-
ley had not suffered a heart attack prior to the collision. The
court rejected the defendant's contention that argument to the
jury should have been allowed on the possibility of a fatal heart
attack before the collision, stating that the natural inference
was that the intestate was killed in the collision and there was
no contrary evidence. The court, however, recognized the prin-
ciple that:
'... the operator of an automobile is not ordinarily charge-
able with negligence because he is suddenly stricken by a
fainting spell, or loses consciousness from some other unfore-
seen cause, and is unable to control the vehicle.' However,
one who relies upon this principle, in explanation of appar-
ently negligent conduct, has the burden of proving sudden
incapacity. 'Of course, before the operator can be exonerated
under this rule, the evidence must have been sufficient to
prove sudden loss of consciousness.'69
Bkipper v. Hartley"° involved a novel question which the
South Carolina Supreme Court had little difficulty deciding:
whether participants racing motor vehicles on public highways
69. Id. at 284, 133 S.E.2d at 797.
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are jointly and concurrently liable. In this wrongful death action,
the plaintiff's intestate was killed while a passenger in an auto-
mobile struck by the Sessions automobile which was racing the
Hartley and Kennedy vehicles. The plaintiff sued all three par-
ticipants in the race. Sessions defaulted; the plaintiff covenanted
not to prosecute suit further against Kennedy; and a verdict
resulted against Sessions for 10,000 dollars actual and 15,000
punitive damages and against Hartley, the only appellant, for
5,000 dollars actual and 10,000 dollars punitive damages.
Despite the fact that there was no contact with the Hartley
automobile, the court had no difficulty in upholding the ver-
dict, applying well-settled principles. Racing on public high-
ways is forbidden by statute,71 violation of which is negligence
per se, it being a jury question whether such violation contrib-
uted as a proximate cause to the plaintiff's injuries. The court
relied on general authorities and a North Carolina case 72 to
the effect that the primary negligence involved is participating
in the race itself and that all participants are jointly liable.
Allen v. Hatchel73 was a suit for death of a guest passenger.
The plaintiff's intestate, Mrs. Allen, had been riding in Mrs.
Hatchell's automobile which was involved in a collision with the
Garner automobile in the intersection of secondary Highway
S-17-54: with through State Highway No. 38. The intersection
was a stop intersection as to the Hatchell vehicle on the secon-
dary road, and the testimony was contradictory as to whether
Mrs. Hatchell fully stopped. The Garner automobile had been
parked about 300 feet from the intersection, had made a U-turn
and had been driving into the intersection at an unlawfully
excessive rate of speed without lights, according to testimony
of Mrs. Hatchell's witnesses. The plaintiff originally sued both
Garner and Mrs. Hatchell, but let Garner out on a covenant not
to sue for 3,000 dollars. The plaintiff got a verdict of 25,000 dol-
lars against Mrs. Hatchell, which was reversed and remanded
for a new trial.
The South Carolina Supreme Court in its majority opinion
held that the trial judge erred in failing to read the entire sec-
tion 46-42374 to the jury, and in reading only the second para-
71. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-356 (1962).
72. Boykin v. Bennett, 253 N.C. 652, 118 S.E2d 12 (1961).
73. 242 S.C. 458, 131 S.E.2d 516 (1963).
74. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-423 (1962).
Vehicle entering through highway or stop intersection.-The driver of
a vehicle shall stop as required by this chapter at the entrance to a through
[Vol. 17
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graph, as the charge might have erroneously conveyed to the jury
the impression that Garner on the dominant highway had an
absolute right-of-way at the intersection, since the second para-
graph of the section inexplicably omits a statement as to the duty
of the driver on the dominant highway. It should be noted that
due to a quirk in the statute7 5 the driver of a vehicle on an un-
favored highway intersecting with a through highway is in a
more favorable position than the driver on an unfavored high-
way intersecting with merely a stop highway, as opposed to a
through highway. Further, the court held that the judge erred
in his charge on speed in that he erroneously told the jury in
effect that the prima facie speed limit of fifty-five miles per
hour was applicable and that the jury could disregard the posted
thirty-five miles per hour speed limit.
The opinion also contains the following statement on the pre-
sumption of obeying the law:
Although it was incumbent upon the appellant here to
yield the right of way, she was not required to anticipate
the approach of a vehicle operated in an unlawful manner.
In the absence of any circumstances which would reasonably
give notice to the contrary, the appellant was entitled to
presume that other approaching vehicles would be operated
in accordance with the law and she would not be negligent,
let alone reckless, in so assuming. . . . The appellant was
entitled to have her conduct judged in the light of the fore-
going presumption. .... 76
Yaun v. Baldridge77 is an important case on the question of
proper control. The appeal involved two suits tried together,
one by parents for medical expenses and other consequential
damages and the other by a minor passenger against her host.
highway and shall yield the right of way to other vehicles which have en-
tered the intersection from the through highway or which are approaching
so closely on such through highway as to constitute an immediate hazard,
but such driver having so yielded may proceed and the drivers of all other
vehicles approaching the intersection on such through highway shall yield
the right of way to the vehicle so proceeding into or across the through
highway.
The driver of a vehicle shall likewise stop in obedience to a stop sign as
required herein at an intersection where a stop sign is erected at one or
more entrances thereto although not a part of a through highway and shall
proceed cautiously, yielding to vehicles not so obliged to stop which are
within the intersection or approaching so closely as to constitute an imme-
diate hazard, but may then proceed.
75. Ibid.
76. Allen v. Hatchell, 242 S.C. 458. 468, 131 S.E.2d 516, 522 (1963).
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In the latter case the parties had been dating at the time of the
collision and were married two months later. The accident oc-
curred on a winding paved highway with narrow unkept dirt
shoulders, and with trees growing close to the paved surface in
places. The posted speed limit was 35 miles per hour. The auto-
mobile being driven by the defendant veered to the right of the
highway, traveled for about fifty feet on a narrow dirt shoulder
and then struck a tree, resulting in serious personal injuries to the
plaintiff guest passenger who was sitting on the driver's right
on the front seat. The defendant's explanation was that when
the plaintiff became irresponsive, he looked at her, saw her head
falling and reached out to grab her, moving over in the seat
closer to her, and then felt something pull the wheel after a few
seconds and looked up to see the tree immediately in front of him.
The defendant appealed from the adverse verdict contending
that as a matter of law the evidence was insufficient to support a
verdict under the guest statute. The court rejected such conten-
tion, stating:
These undisputed facts, standing alone, are susceptible of
either of two inferences: (1) That the defendant deliberately
brought about the collision; or (2) that the defendant exer-
cised no control over the movement of the automobile just
prior to the collision. Either inference inculpates him and
calls for a reasonable explanation.78
The court upheld the verdict below, reasoning as follows:
According to his own testimony, for an interval of time this
defendant completely abandoned the performance of his
duty to keep a lookout and to control the movement of his
automobile. He seeks to justify this otherwise grossly reck-
less conduct on the ground that it was necessary for him to
do so in order to protect plaintiff from harm. Viewing the
evidence in a light favorable to plaintiff, as must be done in
passing upon the exceptions to the refusal of the court to
direct a verdict, we think that jury issues were presented.
The jury could with reason have decided that there was no
such emergency as actually or apparently required defend-
ant's intervention before bringing his automobile to a safe
stop. If there was, the evaluation of his conduct in the light
of the emergency was likewise for the jury. These issues were
78. Id. at 417, 134 S.E2d at 250.
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properly submitted to the triers of the facts under a fair
charge.7
9
In Christy v. Reid,80 a guest passenger case, the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court reversed the order of involuntary nonsuit
granted below. Basing its decision upon the recent case of Yaun
qv. Baldridge81 the court stated:
It is true that there was no direct evidence presented by
Appellant's witnesses as to excessive speed, and it is doubtful
whether the evidence presented as to faulty steering mechan-
ism is sufficient to warrant a reasonable inference of reck-
lessness; however, the fact that the automobile, in the city
limits, in a 35 m. p. h. zone, while making a left turn, skidded
to the right, jumped the curb, traveled approximately 64
feet before striking a telephone pole with such force as to
completely sever it and turn over is susceptible of the infer-
ence that the driver acted in reckless disregard of the rights
of its passengers sufficient to require submission of the case
to the jury.
8 2
Iii Dudley Trucking Co. v. HollingswortA8 the court re-af-
firmed established principles. One of the defendant's tractor-
trailer units stopped in the nighttime off the roadway in front
of another of the defendant's units which stopped partly on the
pavement where the shoulder was wide enough to accommodate
the rig. The front vehicle was lighted, the rear one unlighted.
The plaintiff's tractor-trailer was severely damaged when it col-
lided with the unlighted rear unit from the rear. The court held
that all issues were properly submitted to the jury, that under
the applicable statute84 the driver of a disabled vehicle is pro-
hibited from stopping on the main traveled portion of the high-
way only when the vehicle is disabled so that it is impossible to
avoid making such stop, and that the burden of proving the
necessity or excuse for stopping on the highway is upon the
person making such a stop. Further, even if the plaintiff's driver
were speeding, the jury could have found that to be merely
simple negligence and the defendant's misconduct recklessness.
79. Id. at 420, 134 S.E.2d at 251.
80. 244 S.C. 27, 135 S.E.2d 319 (1964).
81. 243 S.C. 414, 134 S.E.2d 248 (1964).
82. Christy v. Reid, 244 S.C. 27, 31-32, 135 S.E2d 319, 321 (1964).
83. 243 S.C. 439, 134 S.E.2d 399 (1964).
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The application of the same statute was involved in Suber v.
Smit A85 reviewed above.
Summers v. Watkins Motor Lines"" was a death action arising
from an intersection collision of the defendant's truck on the
favored highway and the automobile in which the plaintiff's
intestate was riding on the unfavored highway. The testimony
was in conflict as to whether the automobile on the unfavored
highway had stopped as required by a stop sign. There was testi-
mony that the truck was traveling at an excessive speed. Judg-
ment for the plaintiff was affirmed, all issues being for the jury.
The court of appeals to some extent relied upon the decision of
Warren v. Watkins Motor Lines,8 7 a companion case arising from
the same collision tried in the state court, in which a judgment
for the plaintiff was upheld by the South Carolina Supreme
Court. The Warren case88 in the state court is an important
decision on the right-of-way at an intersection and the correlative
rights and duties of the motorist on the two highways.
Knight v. Johnson8" holds that the defendant was properly
allowed to introduce testimony as to the plaintiff's motive for
haste, in that the plaintiff in an angry and upset mood was
hurrying to take his son to the doctor. The South Carolina Su-
preme Court held for the first time in this state that:
"Ordinarily, testimony showing a motive for haste is relevant
upon the issue of speed." 0°
Griffin v. Pitt County Transp. Co.91 arose from a collision
which occurred when the plaintiff turned left from the highway
into a private driveway while the defendant's tractor-trailer
truck was apparently in the process of passing from the rear.
In view of the disputed evidence as to the speed and position
of the truck and the giving of signals by the plaintiff, the court
held that all issues were properly submitted to the jury and that
the plaintiff was not guilty of contributory wilfulness as a mat-
ter of law.
Hatchell v. McCracken9 2 holds that where a jury's verdict for
unliquidated damages is inadequate, the trial judge cannot award
85. 243 S.C. 458, 134 S.E.2d 404 (1964).
86. 325 F.2d 120 (4th Cir. 1963).
87. 242 S.C. 331, 130 S.E.2d 896 (1963).
88. Ibid.
89. 244 S.C. 70, 135 S.E.2d 372 (1964).
90. Id. at 72, 135 S.E.2d at 373.
91. 242 S.C. 424, 131 S.E.2d 253 (1963)
92. 243 S.C. 45, 132 S.E.2d 7 (1963).
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judgment in a sum greater than the jury's verdict without giving
the plaintiff, as well as the defendant, the option of a new trial.
In the interesting case of Daniel v. Haze93 the South Carolina
Supreme Court held the trial judge did not err in refusing to
grant the plaintiff a new trial for inadequacy of the verdict for
$7.50 for tail-light and $15.00 for first physical examination,
all issues having been properly submitted to the jury.




Published by Scholar Commons,
